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The author is director of education at Concern for the Dying in New 
York City. As a freelance writer, he has contributed to America, 
Commonweal, The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, The 
Philadelphia Inquirer and USA Today, among other publications. He is a 
graduate of Cambridge University and the University of California at Los 
Angeles where he did graduate work in philosophy. 
Biomedical developments over the last 20 years may not have removed 
the sense of loss, finality and mystery of death, but they have made the 
timing of death more a matter of deliberate decision. 
To conform its observation, made in 1983, the President's Comr .. : --:"n 
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research pointed out that there is hardly a life-threatening 
medical condition for which there is not some intervention to delay the 
moment of death. And in a deliberate understatement, the Commission 
concluded that these developments have raised profound ethical and legal 
questions. 
One of the most pressing continues to be whether withholding or 
withdrawing available life-sustaining treatment from patients in conditions 
. neither terminal nor reversible - persistent vegetative state, for example -
would constitute suicide or euthanasia? 
As recently as last June, the issue was before the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the matter of Cruzan v. Harmon. But it had already presented itself 
dramatically in 1976 when the parents of Karen Ann Quinlan challenged 
American common and constitutional law to secure the right of their 
permanently comatose daughter to a natural death. Coming from a citizen, 
the challenge inevitably had to be met by the courts. Coming from a citizen 
who also happened to be a Roman Catholic, the challenge could not go 
unaddressed by the Church. 
For the courts in 1976, the Quinlan case, the first of its kind ever to be 
tried in court, represented new departures in common and constitutional 
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law. For the Catholic Church in America, it represented an opportunity, 
decisively and effectively taken, to share a rich tradition of medical ethics 
with a society clearly caught off guard by the moral dilemmas posed by the 
case. Now, almost 15 years later, those roles appear to be reversed. The 
courts have developed an impressively consistent body of case law derived 
from the Quinlan decision. But the Catholic Church in America, at least 
judged by conflicting statements of its bishops, has been unable to build on 
its remarkable contribution to the Quinlan case. As a result, now that the 
ethical and legal debate over the right-to-die resumes, following the 
Supreme Court's Cruzan decision, the courts are ready, but the Church 
seems unsure of itself. 
The legal outcome of Quinlan is well known in the unanimous decision of 
the New Jersey Supreme Court to allow the removal of the mechanical 
respirator which was sustaining Karen's life. A landmark decision, it has 
served as the precedent in over 60 so-called right-to-die cases adjudicated in 
the United States since then. 
Less well known is the degree to which Catholic teaching informed the 
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision. Even less well known is the way 
Karen's bishop, the late Lawrence B. Casey of Paterson, advanced that 
teaching in the judicial proceedings so that she could, in good conscience be 
allowed to die a natural death . 
Bishop's Intent 
Casey's primary purpose in submitting an amicus curiae brief in the 
Quinlan case was pastoral. By informing the court of Church teaching, he 
wished to help a Catholic family endure the court's scrutiny of its request to 
allow Karen to die. But the bishop's persuasive argument for the moral 
distinction between withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment and 
euthanasia; his moral justification of the request to withdraw treatment as 
something entirely compatible with Catholic teaching, and his compelling 
explanation of the interrelationship of medicine, law and theology, went far 
beyond that primary purpose. Ultimately, all three gave shape and 
substance to the court's precedent-setting decision. 
Like all those directly involved n the Quinlan case, Bishop Casey faced 
the moral dilemmas posed by the use of medical technology which weakens 
personal control of one's medical treatment. It is clear that Catholic 
teaching allowed him to make a number of critical assumptions. For one, 
there are patients whose medical condition can be considered hopeless by 
competent medical authorities. For another, the distinction between 
ordinary and extraordinary medical care of such patients is not only useful 
but necessary to make correct moral decisions, including withholding or 
withdrawing treatment according to the expressed or implied wishes of the 
patient. Finally, laws and ethical standards are essential if we are to make 
decisions of this kind securely. 
On the basis of these assumptions , Casey submitted to the court what 
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Paul W. Armstrong, the Quinlan attorney, describes as a dispositive brief. 
Pointing out that competent medical authorities had established that Karen 
was beyond reasonable hope of recovery, and that the continued use of a 
respirator to sustain her life constituted extraordinary means of treatment, 
Casey concluded there was no moral obligation to continue it. The request 
to stop treatment was, therefore, morally correct. 
At the center of Casey's argument is the fundamental belief that every 
person's life is sacred. In keeping with that inviolability, and as an essential 
responsibility toward it, Casey also emphasized the notion of personal 
stewardship of one's life. Since human life is not limitless, individuals must 
be responsible stewards of their bodies, particularly when they are making 
decisions about medical care at the end oflife or under irreversible medical 
conditions. To assist meeting the responsibilities of stewardship, Casey 
offered the distinguishing concepts of ordinary and extraordinary medical 
care, combined with a calculation of their respective benefits and burdens in 
relation to specific medical conditions. Finally, underpinning the idea of 
responsible stewardship was the assertion that each person is vested with 
the moral authority to make decisions about withholding or withdrawing 
medical treatment at the end of life. 
It is clear that the court found this persuasive. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in its use of the constitutional right of privacy to resolve the 
legal problems posed by Karen Quinlan. 
We think that the state's interest (in the preservation of life) weakens and the 
individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases 
(extraordinary medical care) and the prognosis dims (calculation of benefit and 
burden). Ultimately, there comes a point at which the individual's rights (moral 
authority) overcome the State interest. 
Parallel Not Difficult to See 
The parallel between the court's constitutional argument and Bishop 
Casey's theological argument is not too difficult to see. confronted with the 
plight of Karen Ann Quinlan, Bishop Casey identified moral prerogratives 
in the exercise of the right to a natural death. Similarly, the court was 
moved to recognize a constitutional right to a natural death. Both agreed 
that there are transcendent rights - moral and constitutional- to aspire to 
higher purposes than simply maintaining life as its own end. As a result, the 
court confirmed constitutionally what the bishop presented as a moral right 
to a natural death. 
How unusual is it that an argument, derived from theological premises, 
should have been so persuasive in a secular court? Such an outcome does 
not surprise Daniel Callahan, director of the Hastings Center in New York. 
"I think there are certain basic concepts used in these debates, particularly 
on the withdrawing of care, that have come heavily from the Catholic 
tradition. So, historically there has been a major contribution in that 
regard." Moreover, according to Kevin O'Rourke, O.P., director of the 
Center for Health Care Ethics, St. Louis University Medical Center, 
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Missouri, it is appropriate for a pluralistic society, like the United States, to 
use Catholic thinking to address the ethical problems facing it. "We have a 
very sound policy and a very sound philosophy, founded on natural law 
reasoning," he said. As a result, O'Rourke thinks that Catholic arguments 
on many ethical issues today should present no inherent difficulties for a 
society essentially secular in its orientation. "Being a pluralistic society does 
not mean it is a value-free society," he noted, adding that we have, as a 
society, to reach a consensus, and the best way to do that is through natural 
law thinking. 
The framework of a reasonable consensus emerged from Bishop Casey's 
interpretation of the relationship of theology to law and medicine. In his 
brief, he went to considerable lengths to demonstrate the nature of this 
relationship as it revealed itself in the right to a natural death. Medicine, 
using advanced technology, can prolong biological life. Law works to 
secure each person's right to life out his life span until it ends naturally and 
inevitably. Theology, while it acknowledges man's dissatisfaction with 
biological life as an end in itself, insists on the sacredness of human life and 
defends it from all direct assault. 
For Casey, there was a very practical application of the relationship, 
indeed as he understood it - the interdependence of theology, law and 
medicine, to the case of Karen Quinlan. Civil law, his argument went, is not 
expected to assert a belief in eternal life. At the same time, it may not ignore 
the right of someone to such a belief and to manage the circumstances of his 
death according to it. Medical science may not directly cause natural death. 
But neither should it prevent death when all hope of restoration of even 
some minimum exercise of human life is irretrievably gone. Finally, religion 
is not expected to define biological death, but it should do all it can to form 
a correct conscience to accept natural death when medical science has 
determined that it is inevitable, and there is no hope other than preserving 
biological life in a merely vegetative state. From this relationship, Casey 
asserted, theological, legal and medical reasons can be drawn to justify the 
removal of the respirator sustaining Karen Quinlan's life. 
Casey Advanced Argument 
But Casey also advanced this argument more generally in the interest of 
laws and ethical standards which would enable society in future to deal with 
the kind of problems posed by Karen Quinlan. In the course of the public 
discussion of her case, it had become common knowledge that responsible 
medical professionals, patients and their families were exercising what 
Casey defined as a freedom to stop treatment where there was no realistic 
hope of some recovery. As if to anticipate the court's correct observation 
that there were then no civil laws to sanction such freedom, he insisted that 
there had always been solid ethical and theological justification. To confirm 
this, Casey pointed out that the practice of stopping treatment when there 
was no realistic hope of recovery had it no way undermined society'S sense 
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,,,of reverence for human life. All of which, he believed, gave urgency to the 
need for laws underwriting moral arguments and medical practice which 
embrace the right to a natural death. 
The legal resolution of the Quinlan case is a remarkable blend of 
theological and judicial thinking. According to attorney Armstrong, 
"Catholic teaching was woven into the very fiber of the court's decision." 
Theologically, there was the longstanding tradition that saw human life as 
finite. Originating from the hands of a loving God, it is expected to 
surrender itself naturally in death to His ultimate providence. 
For its part, the court found in the Constitution the principle of privacy 
by which an individual can assert his autonomy to stop technologically 
applied medical care which artificially prolongs life beyond the point of 
reasonable personal control. Theological tradition allowed Casey to claim 
for Karen Quinlan the right to a natural death. The Constitution allowed 
the court to endorse the bishop's claim. 
This particular outcome demonstrated that both court and Church 
understood the underlying moral and legal questions posed in Quinlan and, 
by sharing their insights, they were able to provide a most effective solution. 
Subsequently, faced with similar cases, courts around the country 
borrowed heavily from the seminal thinking found in Quinlan. In marked 
·contrast, however, American Catholic bishops have been much less certain 
about the continued application of that judicial thinking, albeit thinking 
substantially informed by Catholic theology, to cases involving the right to 
a natural death. Casey, out of pastoral concern for Karen Quinlan, was 
prepared to embrace the fullness of Catholic thinking on the right to a 
natural death. Bishops dealing with the issue after him have appeared 
preoccupied with shaping public opinion. To this end, they have seen fit to 
pick and choose selectively from their theological tradition. The result has 
been a series of mixed messages which, unlike Bishop Casey's intervention, 
has done little to serve the needs of public policy or pastoral care. 
Jobes Case 
This development began to emerge particularly clearly in 1985 with the 
case, again in New Jersey, of Nancy Ellen Jobes. As the result of a medical 
malpractice, she had been in a persistent vegetative state for five years when 
her husband petitioned the court for permission to remove the feeding tube 
keeping Nancy alive. The court, in granting the petition, returned to its 
seminal Quinlan decision and the Catholic teaching with which it was 
informed. However, the New Jersey bishops submitted a friend ofthe court 
brief opposing the request. In Quinlan, Bishop Casey had argued for the 
acceptance of natural death when medical science has confirmed its 
inevitability beyond any hope other than preserving biological life in a 
merely vegetative state, thereby accepting "quality of life" .as a valid 
. criterion. In 1981, a Pontifical Commission, Cor Unum, released a report 
on the issue of "quality oflife" which said essentially the same thing. In part, 
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the report concluded that among all the criteria for decisions regarding 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, of particular importance is the 
quality of the life to be saved by the treatment. But in Jobes, the New Jersey 
bishops took a different approach. They argued that the quality of the 
patient's life must not be the basis for deciding to withdraw or withhold 
treatment, and asserted that food and water should generally be considered 
ordinary means of maintaining the life of someone in Jobes's medical 
condition. The bishops of Florida came to the same judgment in 1989 when 
they declared, "We can never justify the withdrawal of sustenance on the 
basis of the quality of life of the patient." Understandably, bishops might 
disagree among themselves over whether there is a real distinction between 
withdrawing a respirator and withdrawing a feeding tube. That continues to 
be a debatable question even within medical circles, though increasingly it is 
seen as a distinction without a difference. But the disagreement over 
"quality oflife" as a legitimate criterion in deciding to withdraw or withhold 
life-sustaining measures is a disagreement in principle. Why would such a 
disagreement among the bishops emerge at such a serious level? 
Callahan's Reasoning 
According to Daniel Callahan, one reason is that many of the Catholics 
speaking out on this issue have become much more conservative than 
Catholic tradition itself. By way of explanation, Callahan said, "I think they 
see slippery slopes all over the place." He added that many conservatives 
have, for example, been opposed to legislation for living wills, not because it 
is bad in itself, but because they see it as the opening wedge in a campaign 
for the legalization of euthanasia. Callahan believes that, for similar 
reasons, the opposition to withholding or withdrawing nutrition and fluids 
is more tactical than principled. He points out that many of those in 
opposition will acknowledge the Church's long established teaching that, 
under certain circumstances, there is no moral obligation to sustain life. 
"Nevertheless, they justify their opposition with a statement like, 'we know 
what the other side is up to. This is the opening salvo, and if we don't draw 
the line here, they'll take us farther down the road,' " Callahan said. 
This, apparently, is the position of John Cardinal O'Connor. Writing in 
Catholic New York. the New York diocesan paper, immediately after the 
Jobes decision, he said, "As far as 1 can see, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
has gone a long distance down the slippery slope and made my 'consistent 
ethic of death' frighteningly plausible." As O'Connor presented it in his 
article, the court decision broadened the justification for withholding or 
withdrawing artificial nutrition and fluids , and extended to family members 
and friends the right to make such decisions for incompetent patients. 
Lamenting this, O'Connor concluded that the court had guaranteed the 
right to die, or suicide, as he said he would prefer to call it. 
The cardinal's purpose, writing as he does, appears to be polemical. He 
presents, unfortunately quite inaccurately, the case of Nancy Jobes as a 
56 Linacre Quarterly 
precedent for one day putting out of their misery "the retarded, the wheel-
chaired, the cancer-ridden, and all sorts of useless or annoying persons." 
Indeed, his preoccupation with the "slippery slope" he sees here is so great 
that he allows it to exclude considerations which, from a pastoral 
perspective at least, are critical. Of these, the most obvious would be an 
acknowledgement of the right to a natural death which figured so forcefully 
in Bishop Casey's thinking as something entirely consistent with traditional 
Catholic belief. In marked contrast, Cardinal O'Connor emphasizes what 
might be called "biological vitalism" when, in the same article, he said, "Isn't 
it any longer 'self-evident' that you can be neither free nor happy unless 
you're alive?" 
O'Connor took the strongest exception to the court considering 
artificially provided nutrition and fluids as medical treatment, and 
therefore something that could be withdrawn from Nancy Jobes. "I cannot 
accept the notion that food and hydration constitute medical treatment 
simply because they may be given, in certain instances, by artificial means 
under medical supervision." 
A Difficult Reconciliation 
It is difficult to reconcile this position with that of Bishop Louis E. 
Gelineau of Providence, Rhode Island. In 1989, Gelineau declared pu blicly 
that the provision of nutrition and fluids through a feeding tube is a medical 
treatment. He therefore concluded that, in the case of Rhode Island resident 
Marcia Gray, a comatose patient beyond reasonable hope of recovery, the 
continuation of artificial feeding was disproportionate to any expected 
medical benefit. As something unduly burdensome to the patient, it could, 
the bishop determined, be withdrawn. Since the medical condition and 
prognosis of Nancy Jobes and Marcia Gray were almost the same, Gelineau 
would not, presumably, have objected to the Jobes decision. 
Yet another case very similar to that of Nancy Jobes has prompted 
statements from individual Catholic bishops. Writing in his diocesan 
newspaper in December, 1989, Bishop John Leibrecht of Missouri 
addressed the question of withdrawing artificial feeding from Nancy 
Cruzan who had been in a persistent vegetative state, the result of a car 
accident, since 1983. He pointed out that Catholic moral theology offers 
two approaches to this particular case. In one, there are moral principles 
coalescing around respect for human life as something over which only God 
has absolute dominion. They lead "to a valid Catholic position which 
opposes removal of Nancy Cruzan's gastrostomy tube," Leibrecht said. But 
there are other moral principles coalescing around respect for the person 
and God's gift of personhood. These constitute the basis for a second 
approach and would justify the withdrawal of treatment from Cruzan. 
Leibrecht concluded that since neither the Vatican nor the National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops has chosen definitively between the two, 
either is morally acceptable in the case of Cruzan. 
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John F. Whealon, Archbishop of Hartford, Connecticut, is in essential 
agreement with Leibrecht. However, in a statement in his diocesan paper in 
February, Whealon declared that Catholic moral theology is not certain 
whether the means used to feed Nancy Cruzan were ordinary or 
extraordinary. Given that doubt, he concluded that in her case the 
presumption should favor the continuation of treatment. 
Of all the Catholic bishops speaking publicly on this issue, Joseph 
Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago preeminently seems able to bring the full 
range of Catholic thinking persuasively into play in a pluralistic society. In 
his 1988 address to the Center for Clinical Medical Ethics at the University 
of Chicago, Bernardin unequivocally supported the right to a natural death. 
"We ... may not develop a policy to keep alive those who should be 
allowed a natural death, that is, those who are terminally ill, or, to preclude 
a decision - informed by our ethical principles and on a case by case basis 
- that the artificial provision of nutrition and hydration has become 
useless or unduly burdensome." 
Bernardin's Statement Differs 
Bernardin's statement is noticeably different from that of O'Connor, but 
in tone and content it reflects one of the essential thrusts of the Vatican's 
1980 "Declaration on Euthanasia". There the Vatican confirmed that 
treatment could, with the permission of the patient, be interrupted when the 
results were less than expected. Asserting that withdrawing treatment is not 
equivalent to suicide, the Vatican said, "On the contrary, it should be 
considered as an acceptance of the human condition, or a wish to avoid the 
application of a medical procedure disproportionate to the results that can 
be expected." 
According to John J. Paris, S.J., associate professor of medical ethics at 
the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts, the treatments 
referred to in the Declaration include artificially-provided nutrition and 
fluids. Evidence for that, he maintains, is found in the most recent policy 
statement ofthe Pro-Life Committee ofthe U.S. Catholic Conference. In its 
discussion of the rights of the terminally ill, the Committee stated, "Laws 
dealing with medical treatment may have to take account of exceptional 
circumstances where even means of providing nourishment may be too 
ineffective or burdensome to be obligatory." 
In June, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the case of Cruzan v. Harmon. 
It declared that the Missouri State Supreme Court had not acted 
unconstitutionally when it refused permission to withdraw nutrition and 
fluids from Nancy Cruzan on the grounds that there was not clear and 
convincing evidence that this is what Cruzan herself would have wanted. 
Apart from that, the Supreme Court clearly distanced itself from the 
Missouri Court on several critical points. For the first time, it said that 
competent patients have the constitutional right to refuse life support 
treatment. It also found that there is no difference between artificially 
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provided nutrition and fluids and other life-sustaining measures. Finally, 
the Supreme Court declared that individuals who have provided clear and 
convincing evidence of their intention to refuse life-sustaining measures 
-by means of a living will, for example - may have a constitutional right 
to have those wishes honored. In her concurring but separate decision, 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor declared that there may well be a 
constitutional requirement to protect the patient's liberty interest in 
refusing medical treatment by giving effect to the decisions of surrogates. 
The net effect of the Supreme Court's decision has been far from 
definitive. If anything, it has made inevitable a re-examination of the issues 
central to the so-called right to die. As this proceeds, the Catholic Church 
will, as in Quinlan, have the opportunity to put at the disposal of all 
participating a rich and nuanced tradition. But there is a legitimate concern 
that unless the sharp differences among the bishops can be overcome and 
replaced by a full and forthright declaration of Church teaching, the 
opportunity will be lost. 
And, according to Cardinal Bernardin, lost with serious consequences. 
"If we do not resolve this critical issue in a way that resonates with the 
common sense of people good will, then we may contribute to the sense of 
desperation that will lead people to consider euthanasia as an alternative 
solution to the problem." 
Should his fellow bishops take Bernardin's warning seriously, they now 
have the opportunity to follow where Bishop Casey led, mindful of the 
gospel's vision of the meaning of life which transcends any sense of loss, 
finality and mystery death undeniably possesses. 
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